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PUBLISHER I EDITEUR 
ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES 
AS MULTIPRODUCT FIRMS: 
CORRECTING SOME MISCONCEPTIONS 
by 
M. N. DARROUGH AND J. M. HEINEKE* 
The comment by Pyle and Deadman [PD] on our paper deals with several points 
which arise regularly in empirical applications of economic theory and especially in 
applications in which "firms" do not operate in traditional market places. Their 
first point concerns the appropriate definition of output in law enforcement 
agencies: Is the final output deterrence of future crimes, solving existing crimes, 
both, or something else? PD argue that deterrence {crime prevention) is the primary 
output of law enforcement agencies, and from society's perspective, this is 
undoubtedly true. But as we attempted to make clear in our paper, we were 
interested in modeling the decision process of an individual agency. Conversations, 
both with academics working in the area of law enforcement and with practitioners, 
convinced us that on a day to day basis, police departments were much more likely 
to be interested in solving crimes than in deterrence. The reason for this is clearly 
that city, county and state officials, newspaper reporters and the populace in 
general, find it much easier to evaluate agency performance as a function of crimes 
solved rather than as a function of crimes deterred. The point here is that we chose 
our measure of output to be solutions of crimes of various types because the 
decision makers most immediately involved in the operation of agencies have 
strong incentives to focus on precisely these measures. 1 
PD also suggest that clearances by conviction would be a better measure of crime 
"solutions". We agree, but unfortunately these data are not generally available. 
There are several misinterpretations and inaccuracies in the PD comment in 
addition to the above. We comment on each in the order they appear. It is not 
accurate to say that our paper "concentrates on property crime solutions to the 
exclusion of all else". The fifth and sixth outputs are solutions to crimes against the 
person and "other" police services, respectively. In fact, the marginal cost of 
solving crimes against the person as well as rates of transformation between this 
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output and solutions to the various property crimes were calculated and displayed 
in Table 2. 
PD believe that a cost minimization model would have been a more appropriate 
vehicle for estimating agency production technologies. Perhaps so, but the required 
assumption that all outputs are fixed and taken by law enforcement agencies as 
parameters in their decisions appears to be empirically untenable. In addition, 
granted that a number of interesting questions can be addressed in the context of 
cost minimization, these questions are, for the most part, entirely different from 
those that arise in the value maximizing framework - questions concerning the 
optimal output mix. It is these questions we sought to address in the paper. 
PD take us to task for not utilizing the "seriousness indices" developed by 
Anderson and by Sellin and Wolfgang. It is our considered opinion that the 
methodological weaknesses of these indices are severe enough to preclude their 
consideration. In addition, even if one did use such indices, law enforcement 
agencies still end up being "price" takers - an assumption PD argue against. 
We assumed that police agencies are price takers in both input and output 
markets. PD are concerned that pure competition leads to indeterminancy in 
constant, and decreasing cost industries. But clearly, being a price taker does not 
imply pure competition. For one thing law enforcement agencies are subject to the 
financial constraint of the agency budget (note 7), which in turn implies increasing 
marginal costs whenever the constraint is binding. In addition, in our sample, 
technology in various agencies exhibits decreasing, constant, and increasing returns 
to scale as the city size increases. This suggests that larger cities have cost 
advantages, but does not necessarily imply that these economies continue 
indefinitely. And even if economies, theoretically, persisted this is not inconsistent 
with price-taking behavior, since political and legal boundaries limit the scale of 
operation in the law enforcement industry. 
Our model deals primarily with short run problems where capital (i.e., police 
stations, equipment, patrol cars, etc.) is fixed. Variable inputs in the model are the 
several types of labor. PD complain that only one input (labor) price is included in 
the estimated cost function. Yet we clearly indicated that wages for eight types of 
labor were available and used to test for the existence of a Hicksian price index. This 
index is our variable w. Nothing is gained and much is lost if one were to attempt to 
include all wages in the estimated function. 
Finally, PD worry lest there be insufficient wage variation across the sample to 
identify the cost function. City police salaries are set by city governments for the 
most part, and not by a national salary board and vary considerably from city to 
city. 
The overall thrust of the remarks by PD is well taken. We agree wholeheartedly 
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that in order to make significant progress in this area, better data are needed in 
addition to a better theoretical framework to deal with non-marketed outputs. 
NOTES 
* The authors are Assistant Professor and Professor of EconomicS, University of Santa Clara, 
California. 
1 We did not argue, as PD mistakenly allege, that crime prevention activities of agencies are 
proportional to population size. Rather we argued that non-crime-solving activities, e.g., administering 
first aid, mediating family quarrels, quieting barking dogs, etc., were proportional to the size of the 
population. 
